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Abstract
Security defects to be found in C .C .I .T .T . Recommendation X.509-1988 are described together wit h
possible solutions .
1. Introductio n
The purpose of this short paper is to discuss certain security defects which have recently bee n
discovered in C.C.I .T.T. Recommendation X .509-1988, [2] . Each defect is described and a possibl e
solution is outlined. A discussion of the use of the X .509 authentication framework to provide securit y
for X.400 electronic mail may be found in [4] ; this latter paper also briefly discusses security defects t o
be found in the X .400 Recommendations .
2. Over-restrictive definition of digital signatures
2 .1 . Problem description
The Authentication Framework described in CCITT Recommendation X .509 allows both generic publi c
key cryptosystems and generic symmetric cryptosystems . However the technique defined in clause 8 . 1
of X.509 for producing digital signatures requires the underlying public key cryptosystem to have ver y
special properties (outlined in clause 6.1 of X.509) . In practice this almost certainly mandates the us e
of the RSA public key cryptosystem, described in Annex C of X .509, and rules out use of other, poten-
tially more desirable, digital signature techniques .
The root cause of the problem would seem to be the desire for each user to have a single publi c
key/secret key pair, used for both the generation of digital signatures and the encryption of data (fo r
confidentiality purposes) . Note that the requirement for both these types of cryptographic operation ar e
present in all three of the authentication protocols described in clauses 9 .2-9 .4 of X.509 .
The observed problems then stem from the need for means to be provided for a single cryptosystem t o
provide both these types of functionality . In X.509 it is assumed that there exists a single public ke y
cryptosystem which is used in two ways :
- if user A wishes to provide confidentiality for data sent to user B then A encrypts this dat a
using B ' s public key .
- if user A wishes to provide authentication services (e .g . origin authentication and integrity )
for data sent to user B then A decrypts this data using A's secret key .
As described in clause 6 .1, this requires the public key cryptosystem used to have the property that both
keys in the key pair can be used for encipherment . In practice this virtually mandates the use of th e
RSA cryptosystem .
2.2 . Possible solutions
There are two alternatives to the X .509 scheme, both of which remove the need for such restrictiv e
requirements on the cryptosystem used . We now describe these two solutions, and note their advan-
tages and disadvantages ; either solution could be included as an enhancement to the Recommendation
to remove the restrictive requirements .
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The first alternative stems from the observation that X.509 does not need to specify so closely ho w
digital signatures should be derived from the underlying public key cryptosystem (no more than it need s
to specify which cryptosystem or hash function is used) . All that is needed is some means of indicatin g
(probably by algorithm-identifiers) which means is in use . Many public-key cryptosystems can be used
to create digital signatures, but the means by which this is done tends to be specific to the algorithm
concerned .
The main advantage of this alternative is that it requires a minimal number of changes to X.509 ; in par-
ticular it retains the idea of using a single key pair for both data encryption and digital signature .
Moreover, the ASN .1 SIGNED and SIGNATURE macros defined in clauses 8 .5 and 8.6 remain per-
fectly satisfactory as they are currently defined, since they provide an algorithm-identifier for indicatin g
which signature algorithm is in use . This identifier can be used to both specify the underlying publi c
key cryptosystem and the way in which it is to be used to provide a digital signature .
The main disadvantage with this alternative is that it does not allow use of digital signature scheme s
not derived directly from public key cryptosystems . This is unfortunate since some of the most promis-
ing recent suggestions for digital signature schemes are based on the theory of zero- knowledge proto-
cols, and they do not have corresponding public-key cryptosystems .
The second alternative involves dispensing with the requirement that a single key pair should be use d
for both data encryption and digital signature . There is no obvious reason why every user should no t
have two key pairs - one for encrypting and decrypting data and the other for generating and checkin g
signatures .
The main advantage of this alternative is that it allows the use of arbitrary public key cryptosystem s
and digital signature algorithms . This is particularly important if the scheme is to be useful in th e
future, when, as is the case at the moment, new algorithms are invented (and broken!) on an almos t
daily basis .
The main disadvantage with this alternative is that it requires rather radical changes to the existing tex t
of X .509 .
3 . Potentially defective token structure
3 .1 . Problem description
The token used in clauses 9 .2-9 .4 has the following general form (when sent from user A to user B) :
A( tA , rA , B, r B , sgnData, Bp[encData] )
where tA , rA and rB are time stamps and random numbers, B is the name of B, sgnData is a collection
of non-confidential parameters (e .g . authentication checks for accompanying data), encData is a collec-
tion of confidential parameters (e .g . secret keys), Bp[x] denotes the encryption of data x using the pub-
lic key of B and A( y ) denotes data y with a signed version of y appended . Inclusion of sgnData an d
encData within the token is intended to provide origin authentication, integrity and non-repudiation ser-




The problem with this form of token is that it involves signing encrypted data, which is generall y
accepted to be bad practice . Not only is this undesirable from an aesthetic view-point, but it also lead s
to potentially serious security loop-holes . We next present an example of how this form of token ca n
lead to a catastrophic security failure .
Suppose user A wishes to make an enquiry of a public database B . The information in the database i s
public, but the nature of the enquiry is confidential. User A therefore provides confidentiality an d
authentication checks for the message . We suppose that the message transfer medium between A and B
is X.400 electronic mail, the 1988 version of which uses the X.509 authentication token to provide
security services for mail items .
User A encrypts the message using some conventional (symmetric) encryption algorithm, and include s
the key used in the encData parameter of a token which accompanies the message (the form of th e
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token is as given above) . A also computes an integrity check for the message, and includes this check
in the sgnData parameter of the token (if the method used to compute the integrity check is key-based ,
then any secret key used can be included in the encData portion of the token) .
A would then reasonably expect this message to remain confidential . Unfortunately this is not so, as w e
now explain .
Suppose malicious user C intercepts the message between A and B . C constructs a new message, con-
taining the same encrypted content as the old message, but accompanied by a new token with the form :
C[ tC, rC, B, rB , sgnData, Bp[encData] }
where the values sgnData and Bp[encData] are taken directly from the token (generated by A) whic h
accompanied the original message . Note that at this point C cannot read any of the content of the mes-
sage because C does not know how to decrypt Bp[encData] .
When B receives the new message he decrypts it and authenticates it and believes it to come from C .
He then constructs an appropriate reply (perhaps including the request) and sends it back to C . C now
reads the response and can work out what A's original request was, even though it was encrypted and C
did not have the means to decrypt it !
This problem was discovered by Burrows, Abadi and Needham . A brief discussion can be found i n
Section 11 of [1] .
3 .2 . Possible solution
The most straightforward solution (and one which provides for a certain degree of backwards compati-
bility) is to allow the use of more than one kind of token . This would require the use of a token-typ e
identifiers, and recognition of the possibility of other kinds of token in the text in X .509 . As with th e
proposed solutions to the previous problem, this could be added to the Recommendation as an enhance-
ment .
If an additional token form is required which does not have the problem identified in the existing token ,
then the simplest possible solution is probably as follows . This modification involves no additiona l
effort as far as token construction is concerned, and it is simply to require that the encryption of enc -
Data is done after the signature operation instead of before . This requires the general form of toke n
(sent from A to B) to be as follows :
t A , rA , B, rB , sgnData, Bp[encData], As[h(L) ]
where
L = tA , rA , B, rB , sgnData, encData .
4 . Defective 3-way authentication protocol
4 .1 . Problem description
The 3-way authentication protocol described in clause 9 .4 of X.509 is defective and does not provide a
full peer-entity authentication service .
The protocol is as follows :
A--->B : A( tA , rA, B )
B—>A: B ( t B , rB , A, rA )
A- *B: B () .
The text of clause 9 .4 clearly states that the checking of timestamps t A and t B is optional if all three
messages are used . Unfortunately, as we now describe, tA must still be checked if the above protocol i s
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to work (thus making the third message completely redundant!) .
Consider the following example. Suppose A and B have used the above protocol on some previou s
occasion, and that malicious user C has intercepted the above three messages . In addition suppose tha t
timestamps are not used and are all set to O . Finally now suppose that C wishes to impersonate A to B .
C initially sends the first of the above three messages to B :
C-->B: A( 0, rA , B )
B responds (thinking it is talking to A, but actually talking to C) . It challenges C with a new rando m
value, rB :
B— C: B { 0, rB ', A, r A )
C meanwhile causes A to initiate authentication with C (by some means) . As a result A sends C th e
following message :
A—>C: A( 0, IA ', c ) .
C, when responding to A, uses the random value rB , provided to C by B :
C— A: C [ 0, rB ', A, rA )
A responds with the following messag e
A—>C : A{ rB' ) .
But this is exactly what C needs to (falsely) convince B that it is talking to A, i .e . C can now sen d
C--4B : A( rB )
and B will believe that it is talking to A whereas it is actually talking to C .
This problem was discovered by Burrows, Abadi and Needham . The above discussion is a paraphrase d
version of their text ; the proposed solution is also theirs (see [1], Section 11) .
4.2 . Possible solutio n
This problem has a very simple fix, namely the inclusion of the name of B in the signed information fo r
the third message. This does, in fact, very much improve the symmetry of the 3- way protocol . The
only textual change required in X .509 is to change step 8 of clause 9 .4 to :
A sends the following authentication token to B :
A{ rB , B ) .
5 . Incorrect conditions on use of RSA in Annex C
5 .1 . Problem description
Clause C .6.2 of Annex C of X.509 lists properties that RSA keys must satisfy in order to be secur e
(given current knowledge about the difficulty of factoring large numbers) . The clause concludes wit h
the constraint that e and n must satisfy
e > log 2(n) .
While the constraint is correct, the reason given for requiring it is incorrect .
The relevant text from X .509 is as follows :
It must be ensured that e > log2 (n) in order to prevent attack by taking the e'th root mod n
to disclose the plaintext .
Taking the e ' th root modulo n of a ciphertext block will always reveal the plaintext, no matter what th e
values of e and n are . In general this is a very difficult problem, and indeed is the reason why RSA i s
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secure. The point is that, if e is too small, then taking the normal integer e'th root will be the same a s
taking the e'th root modulo n, and taking integer e'th roots is relatively easy .
5 .2 . Possible solutio n
Replace the clause from X.509 quoted above with the following :
It must be ensured that e > log 2 (n) . If not, then the simple operation of taking the intege r
e'th root of a ciphertext block will disclose the plaintext .
6. Insecure hash function in Annex D
6.1 . Problem description
In clause D.2 of Annex D of X .509, a hash function is described which uses arithmetic modulo N .
Unfortunately, Coppersmith, [3], has recently shown that this hash function is somewhat flawed . Cop-
persmith exhibits a method to construct two different messages with the property that the hashed ver-
sion of one of them is equal to 256 times the hashed version of the other (mod N) . In certain cir-
cumstances this method can then be used to construct a false signature .
6 .2 . Possible solutio n
Replace the clause describing the flawed hash function with text to indicate the example has bee n
deprecated .
7. Use of Security Framework s
The long term future of Recommendation X .509 is unclear since the material covered is being super-
seded by the individual security frameworks for authentication, access control, etc ., that are being con-
sidered by the Distributed Applications Framework (DAF) question in C .C .I .T .T. Study Group VII an d
associated ISO groups, in conjunction with work on security techniques in ISO/IEC/JTC1/SC27 . Unti l
such time as these become Recommendations (or ISO standards), the implementor's guides and infor-
mation provided by bodies like NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) should be util-
ised .
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